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THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS AND DOUBLE 
STANDARDS OF BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT 
Mike Koehler* 
 
In recent years, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement has 
become a top priority for the U.S. government, and government 
enforcement officials have stated that “we in the United States are in a 
unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption” and that FCPA 
enforcement ensures not only that the United States “is on the right side of 
history, but also that it has a hand in advancing that history.”1 
However, the FCPA is not the only statute in the federal criminal code 
concerning bribery.  Rather, the FCPA was modeled in large part after the 
U.S. domestic bribery statute, and when speaking of its FCPA enforcement 
program, the government has recognized that it “could not be effective 
abroad if we did not lead by example here at home.”2  Indeed, the policy 
reasons motivating Congress to enact the FCPA—that corporate payments 
were subverting the democratic process, undermining the integrity and 
stability of government, and eroding public confidence in basic 
institutions—apply with equal force to domestic bribery. 
Against this backdrop, this Article explores through various case studies 
and examples whether the United States’s crusade against bribery suffers 
from uncomfortable truths and double standards.  Through these case 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law; founder and editor of the 
website “FCPA Professor” (www.fcpaprofessor.com); author of the book THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA (2014).  The issues covered in this Article assume 
the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, FCPA enforcement 
(including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission in 
enforcing the FCPA), and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA scrutiny.  
Interested readers can learn more about these topics and others by visiting Professor 
Koehler’s website (http://www.fcpaprofessor.com), specifically the FCPA 101 page 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101).  This Article is part of a symposium entitled 
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at Fordham University School of Law.  
For an overview of the symposium, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword:  Fighting 
Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015). 
 
 1. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, 
Address at the American Conference Institute’s 28th National Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-
general-lanny-breuer-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-28th [http://perma.cc/UYA4-
MLCJ]. 
 2. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, 
Address at the Franz-Hermann Brüner Memorial Lecture at the World Bank (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110525.html [http://perma.cc/ 
B2VD-F42Q]. 
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studies and examples, readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S. 
government “practices what it preaches” when it comes to the enforcement 
of bribery laws and whether the United States is indeed “in a unique 
position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act3 (FCPA) enforcement has 
become a top priority for the U.S. government.  Government enforcement 
officials have stated that “we in the United States are in a unique position to 
spread the gospel of anti-corruption”4 and that FCPA enforcement ensures 
not only that the United States “is on the right side of history, but also that it 
has a hand in advancing that history.”5  However, the FCPA is not the only 
statute in the federal criminal code concerning bribery.  Rather the FCPA 
was modeled in large part after the U.S. domestic bribery statute,6 and when 
speaking of its FCPA enforcement program, the government has recognized 
that it “could not be effective abroad if we did not lead by example here at 
home.”7  To best assess whether the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers 
from uncomfortable truths and double standards, Part I of this Article 
 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
 4. Breuer, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 7. Breuer, supra note 2. 
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highlights relevant background regarding the FCPA, including the policy 
reasons motivating Congress to enact the FCPA. 
Against this backdrop, Part II of this Article uses various case studies to 
explore whether the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from 
uncomfortable truths.  These uncomfortable truths include the following 
examples:  (i) how the U.S. government actively participated in bribery; (ii) 
how the highest levels of the U.S. government knowingly engaged in and 
supported private bribery; (iii) how the identity of the alleged bribe payer 
influenced the U.S. government’s enforcement of bribery laws; (iv) the 
subtle difference between U.S. government and private sector attempts to 
influence foreign government action; and (v) how the U.S. government 
employs overblown and inconsistent rhetoric regarding bribery 
enforcement. 
Part III of this Article explores through various case studies whether the 
U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from double standards.  These double 
standards include:  (i) a variety of direct and indirect corporate interactions 
with U.S. political actors; (ii) corporate interaction with U.S. healthcare 
providers; and (iii) corporate hiring practices. 
Through these case studies and examples, readers can decide for 
themselves whether the U.S. government “practices what it preaches”8 
when it comes to enforcement of bribery laws and whether the United 
States is indeed “in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-
corruption.”9 
I.  RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
Prior to assessing whether the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from 
uncomfortable truths and double standards, it is first necessary to highlight 
relevant background regarding the FCPA, including the policy reasons 
motivating Congress to enact the FCPA. 
In the mid-1970s, Congress journeyed into uncharted territory.  After 
more than two years of investigation, deliberation, and consideration of the 
so-called foreign corporate payments problem, the FCPA emerged in 
1977.10  The FCPA was a pioneering statute and the first law in the world 
governing domestic business conduct with foreign government officials in 
foreign markets. 
As with most new laws, the FCPA did not appear out of thin air.  Rather, 
real events and real policy reasons motivated Congress to act and pass the 
FCPA.  Indeed, as relevant to the subject of this Article, discovery of the 
so-called foreign corporate payments problem resulted in part from the 
work of the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor.11  As noted in The 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. Breuer, supra note 1. 
 10. For an overview of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history, see Mike Koehler, The 
Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 980–1002 (2012). 
 11. See id. at 933. 
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Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (“SEC Report”), a report 
Congress relied upon in enacting the FCPA, 
 In 1973, as a result of the work of the [Watergate Prosecutor,] several 
corporations and executive officers were charged with using corporate 
funds for illegal domestic political contributions.  The Commission 
recognized that these activities involved matters of possible significance 
to public investors, the nondisclosure of which might entail violations of 
the federal securities laws. . . .  These secret funds were used for a number 
of purposes, including in some instances, questionable or illegal foreign 
payments.12 
Along with the SEC’s work, Senator Frank Church’s Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations (“Church Committee”) also helped shine a light 
on questionable corporate conduct.  In 1975, the Church Committee held 
the first of several hearings generally dealing with U.S. corporate political 
contributions to foreign governments.  In opening the hearing, Senator 
Church stated: 
 In the course of the Watergate Committee hearings and the 
investigation by the Special Prosecutor, it became apparent that major 
American corporations had made illegal political contributions in the 
United States.  More recently, the Securities Exchange Commission has 
revealed that several multinational corporations had failed to report to 
their shareholders millions of dollars of offshore payments in violation of 
the Securities laws of the United States.13 
In short, during Congress’s multi-year deliberation and consideration of 
the foreign corporate payments problem, Congress was well aware that the 
problem had domestic analogues.14 
Of further relevance to the subject of this Article was the main 
motivation of Congress in enacting the FCPA.  As Senator Church stated: 
Several oil companies testified before the subcommittee that they had 
made huge political contributions in Italy and Korea, for example.  They 
claimed to be supporting the democratic forces who are friendly to foreign 
capital in those countries, but in fact, they were subverting the basic 
democratic processes of those two countries by making illegal 
contributions and were, at the same time, providing the radical left with 
its strongest election issue.  The large and steady gains made by the 
Italian Communist Party in recent elections are due in no small part to the 
fact that it is believed to be the only non-corrupt political force in the 
 
 12. SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE 
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 2–3 (1976), https://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-corporate-payments-practices-1976.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/QMM2-NV8J]. 
 13. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong. 1 
(1975) (emphasis added). 
 14. See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad:  Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 1, 
13 (1975).  The SEC Chairman noted, “Similar payments, at the local level, anyway, are not 
unknown in the United States.” Id. at 61. 
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country, while the other parties are seen as the handmaidens of foreign 
and domestic financial interests.15 
 Representative John Moss likewise stated: 
Business practices of these corporations abroad often impact directly on 
U.S. foreign policy.  Disclosures have shown that United Brands dealings 
with a Honduran Government and Lockheed’s relationship with the Dutch 
Crown, Italian political parties, and former key leaders of the ruling 
Japanese party had an impact as great as the Department of State might 
have had.   
 Surely the public expects more than to have foreign policy made in the 
board rooms of United Brands or Lockheed.  Not only is a publicly owned 
corporation unaccountable to the public when it uses its assets to bribe 
foreign governmental officials, but also it is unaccountable to its 
shareholders, the ones to whom the assets belong.16 
As highlighted by the above statements, Congress’s main motivation in 
passing the FCPA was not an altruistic, post-Watergate morality mindset as 
is often portrayed in connection with the FCPA’s enactment,17 but rather 
selfish and political:  congressional leaders wanted to make foreign 
governments and foreign political parties accountable and answerable to the 
U.S. government itself, as opposed to private enterprises because of 
improper payments. 
Against this backdrop, President Jimmy Carter signed the FCPA into law 
in 1977.  In pertinent part, President Carter’s signing statement noted: 
 During my campaign for the Presidency, I repeatedly stressed the need 
for tough legislation to prohibit corporate bribery.  [The FCPA] provides 
that necessary sanction. 
 I share Congress [sic] belief that bribery is ethically repugnant and 
competitively unnecessary.  Corrupt practices between corporations and 
public officials overseas undermine the integrity and stability of 
governments and harm our relations with other countries.  Recent 
revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence 
in our basic institutions. 
 This law makes corrupt payments to foreign officials illegal under 
United States law.18 
In recent years, FCPA enforcement has become a top priority of the U.S. 
government.  Indeed, of the nearly 900 federal statutes the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) Criminal Division enforces, the FCPA is one of the DOJ’s 
“top priorities,” and the DOJ has stated that its “focus and resolve in the 
 
 15. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the S. Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 9 (1975). 
 16. Foreign Payments Disclosure:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. 
and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 152 (1976) 
[hereinafter Foreign Payments Disclosure]. 
 17. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery:  
Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 497 (2012). 
 18. Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment 
Disclosure Bill 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977). 
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FCPA area will not abate.”19  The DOJ has a specific FCPA Unit and in 
2010 declared a “new era of FCPA enforcement,” emphasizing that “we are 
here to stay.”20  Likewise, in 2010, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which also enforces the FCPA as to publicly traded 
companies and associated persons, created a specialized FCPA Unit (one of 
only five specialized units at the SEC) and declared that the FCPA would 
be a “vital part” of its overall enforcement program.21 
In 2012, the DOJ escalated its rhetoric concerning FCPA enforcement 
and stated: 
[W]e in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of 
anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery 
laws more vigorously than we do.  The Justice Department’s record of 
accomplishment in this area is a signature achievement of ours . . . .22 
During this new era of FCPA enforcement, those subject to the FCPA have 
been frequently reminded that “robust FCPA enforcement has become part 
of the fabric of the Justice Department” and that its “global anti-corruption 
mission has seeped into the Criminal Division.”23  In the words of the DOJ, 
FCPA enforcement is “our way of ensuring not only that the Justice 
Department is on the right side of history, but also that it has a hand in 
advancing that history.”24 
Against the backdrop of a new era of FCPA enforcement and lofty 
government rhetoric is the fact that the FCPA is not the only statute in the 
federal criminal code concerning bribery.  In fact, the 1977 FCPA was 
modeled in large part after the U.S. domestic bribery statute passed in 
1962.25 
When speaking of its FCPA enforcement program, the DOJ has 
recognized, at least rhetorically, that the United States “could not be 
effective abroad if we did not lead by example here at home.”26  More 
specifically, the DOJ stated: 
[T]he bottom line is this:  At home, we pursue corruption at every level.  
This is important for our domestic stability—it strengthens the legitimacy 
of our democratic institutions, and shows that no person here is above the 
 
 19. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, 
Address at the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress Best 
Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress10/ 
breuer_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DZF-FKKY]. 
 20. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, 
Address at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-
24th-national-conference-foreign-corrupt [http://perma.cc/HFM4-SLZM]. 
 21. Cheryl J. Scarboro, Chief of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, SEC, Remarks 
at News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division (Jan. 13, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm#scarboro [http:// 
perma.cc/YLM5-QN52]. 
 22. See Breuer, supra note 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 26. Breuer, supra note 2. 
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law; and it is important for the work we do internationally—it shows the 
global community that we practice what we preach.27 
Borrowing from the DOJ’s verbiage, “the bottom line” appears to be this:  
as highlighted in this Article through various case studies and examples, the 
U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from several uncomfortable truths and 
double standards.  Through the various case studies and examples presented 
in Part II, readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S. government 
“practices what it preaches”28 when it comes to enforcement of bribery laws 
and whether the U.S. is indeed “in a unique position to spread the gospel of 
anti-corruption.”29 
II.  UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS REGARDING 
THE U.S. CRUSADE AGAINST BRIBERY 
There are several uncomfortable truths regarding the U.S. crusade against 
bribery including the following:  (i) how the U.S. government actively 
participated in bribery; (ii) how the highest levels of the U.S. government 
knowingly engaged in and supported private bribery; (iii) how the identity 
of the alleged bribe payer influenced the U.S. government’s enforcement of 
bribery laws; (iv) the subtle difference between U.S. government and 
private sector attempts to influence foreign government action; and (v) how 
the U.S. government employs overblown and inconsistent rhetoric 
regarding bribery enforcement. 
The above uncomfortable truths should cause pause and reflection about 
whether the U.S. government does indeed “practice what it preaches”30 
when it comes to enforcement of bribery laws and whether the United 
States is indeed “in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-
corruption.”31 
A.  The U.S. Government As an Active Participant in Bribery 
In 2010, Bobby Elkin, Jr. pleaded guilty to a one-count criminal 
information charging conspiracy to violate the FCPA for paying and 
authorizing the payment of bribes to Kyrgyz officials in order to secure 
business for his tobacco company employer.32  At sentencing, the DOJ 
requested that U.S. District Court Judge Jackson Kiser (W.D. Va.) sentence 
Elkin to thirty-eight months in federal prison.33  However, Judge Kiser saw 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Breuer, supra note 1. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, N.C. Businessman Pleads Guilty to Role in Foreign 
Bribery Scheme (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-businessman-
pleads-guilty-role-foreign-bribery-scheme [http://perma.cc/6L6K-A3UU]. 
 33. Mike Koehler, Judge (Again) Significantly Rejects DOJ’s Recommendation in 
Sentencing Bobby Elkins, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ 
judge-again-significantly-rejects-dojs-recommendation-in-sentencing-bobby-elkins [http:// 
perma.cc/D6C6-T6LB]. 
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shades of gray in conduct that the DOJ portrayed as black and white.  Judge 
Kiser noted it was not illegal for the CIA to routinely bribe Afghan 
warlords, and, in the words of Judge Kiser, this parallel “sort of goes to the 
morality of the situation” relevant to the DOJ’s prosecution of Elkin.34  
Accordingly, Judge Kiser rejected the DOJ’s sentencing recommendation, 
sentenced Elkins to probation, and waived the usual probation travel 
restriction allowing Elkin to return to Kyrgyzstan and resume his job with 
another tobacco company.35 
Judge Kiser’s observation about U.S. government conduct in Afghanistan 
was prescient.  In 2013, a New York Times headline read “With Bags of 
Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan.”36  The article stated: 
For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into suitcases, 
backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags have been dropped off 
every month or so at the offices of Afghanistan’s president—courtesy of 
the Central Intelligence Agency.  All told, tens of millions of dollars have 
flowed from the C.I.A. to the office of President Hamid Karzai, according 
to current and former advisers to the Afghan leader. . . .  The 
C.I.A. . . . has long been known to support some relatives and close aides 
of Mr. Karzai.  But the new accounts of off-the-books cash delivered 
directly to his office show payments on a vaster scale, and with a far 
greater impact on everyday governing.37 
The above example alone ought to cause pause and reflection regarding 
whether the United States is truly in a “unique position to spread the gospel 
of anti-corruption”38 or on the “right side of history.”39  Yet, as highlighted 
below, U.S. government-sanctioned bribery with public funds is just one 
example of an uncomfortable truth regarding the U.S. crusade against 
bribery. 
B.  U.S. Government Knowledge and Support of Private Sector Bribery 
One of the most troubling aspects of the foreign corporate payments 
problem Congress learned of during the FCPA legislative process was that 
certain parts of the U.S. government were participants in, or at least 
enablers of, the very problem Congress was seeking to address.  The 
following exchange during a Senate hearing between Senator Jesse Helms 
and Lockheed’s Chairman highlights this issue: 
Senator HELMS.  Do you feel that these bribes or whatever name may be 
applied to them came as any surprise to the Government of the United 
States, specifically of the State Department? 
. . . 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Matthew Rosenberg, With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan, N.Y. 
TIMES (April 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/world/asia/cia-delivers-cash-
to-afghan-leaders-office.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& [http://perma.cc/HZ2T-KNPT]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Breuer, supra note 1. 
 39. Id. 
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[Lockheed Chairman.]  I don’t believe they came as any surprise to the 
State Department or to other branches of the U.S. Government.40 
Senator Helms then directed the following statement to a State 
Department official during the hearing: 
I certainly don’t want to even have the appearance of badgering you, and I 
don’t want to belabor the point, but I am somewhat mystified in the light 
of all the reports that have come to me, sir, that apparently at the State 
Department during all of these years when these things were alleged to 
have occurred, that there was a complete “hear no evil and see no evil.” 
 Now, just tell me this one more time.  Nobody at the State Department 
ever dreamed anything of this sort was going on at any time?41 
Similarly, congressional leaders also viewed the Defense Department as 
being a participant in, or at an least enabler of, the very problem Congress 
was seeking to address.  Senator Proxmire noted during a Senate hearing: 
One of the most disturbing aspects of this is the role the Defense 
Department has played, especially with respect to defense contractors 
who sold abroad.  We have a document which indicates that at one point a 
top official in the Defense Department had counseled defense contractors 
on paying bribes and urged them to do so under circumstances where it 
was necessary.42 
This troubling aspect of bribery and corruption is not a historical relic, 
but continues in the FCPA’s modern era and raises the following question:  
Is it bribery if the conduct was engaged in with the knowledge and support 
of the highest levels of the U.S. government? 
Consider the case of James Giffen, who was criminally charged with 
“making more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil 
transactions, in which [various] American oil companies . . . acquired 
valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan.”43  However, Giffen’s defense 
was that his actions were made with the knowledge and support of the CIA, 
the National Security Council, the State Department, and the White 
House.44  The DOJ did not dispute that Giffen had frequent contacts with 
senior U.S. intelligence officials or that he used his ties within the Kazakh 
government to assist the United States.  With the court’s approval, Giffen 
 
 40. Lockheed Bribery:  Hearings Before the S. Comm on Banking, Hous., and Urban 
Affairs, 94th Cong. 55 (1975). 
 41. Abuses of Corporate Power:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Econ. 
in Gov’t of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 167 (1976). 
 42. Foreign and Corporate Bribes:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 110 (1976) [hereinafter Foreign and Corporate Bribes]. 
 43. Press Release, U.S. Att’y S. Dist. of N.Y., American Businessman Charged with $78 
Million in Unlawful Payments to Kazakh Officials in 6 Oil Transactions; Former Mobil 
Corp. Executive Indicted for Tax Evasion in Kickback Scheme (Apr. 2, 2003), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/04-02-
03williams-pressrelease-indict.pdf [http://perma.cc/7M2C-F6MY]. 
 44. See Mike Koehler, The Giffen Gaffe—The Final Chapter, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 
22, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-giffen-gaffe-the-final-chapter (containing links 
to original source documents) [http://perma.cc/RT2K-FFEC]. 
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sought discovery from the U.S. government to support his public authority 
defense and much of the delay in the case was due to the government’s 
resistance to providing such discovery. 
In 2010, approximately seven years after the enforcement action began, 
the case took a sudden and mysterious turn when Giffen agreed to plead 
guilty to a one-paragraph superseding indictment charging a misdemeanor 
tax violation.45  Presiding Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of 
New York imposed no jail time on Giffen and praised him for advancing 
U.S. “strategic interests,” calling him a Cold War hero and commenting that 
the enforcement action should never have been brought in the first place.46  
Giffen himself stated:  “Would I do it again?  Absolutely.  What we were 
doing was important.”47 
Giffen presumably prevailed over the DOJ not because of the facts or the 
law, but because he possessed significant leverage over the U.S. 
government.  Indeed, a Foreign Policy columnist noted that Giffen’s legal 
team “understood correctly that he could set up a collision between the 
Justice Department and the CIA in which the latter would probably 
prevail.”48  Likewise, a Harper’s Magazine columnist noted that the Giffen 
enforcement action had “been the focus of political manipulation concerns 
for years” and that the end of the case seemed to ratify that view and “[t]he 
notion of an independent, politically insulated criminal-justice 
administration in America [took] another severe hit.”49 
The Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan provides another relevant example 
when considering whether bribery occurs if the conduct was engaged in 
with the knowledge and support of the highest levels of the U.S. 
government.  In 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing 
concerning allegations of corruption in connection with U.S. fuel contracts 
at Manas Air Base, a critical transit and resupply hub for U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan.50  The hearing focused on allegations that U.S. 
contractors who supplied fuel to the air base had significant financial 
 
 45. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Giffen, No. S4 03-WHP-404 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
6, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/08-06-
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dealings with the family of deposed Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev.  
In opening the hearing, Representative John Tierney stated: 
[L]et’s be honest.  At many times throughout our history, the United 
States has closely dealt with unsavory regimes in order to achieve more 
pressing policy or strategic objectives.  That is realism in a nutshell.  But 
the United States also prides itself on a more enlightened view of our role 
in the world and our long-term interests in universal respect for 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. 
 Some suggest that the United States has allowed strategic and logistical 
expedience in Kyrgyzstan to become a lasting embrace of two corrupt and 
authoritarian regimes.  Regardless of U.S. intent, we are left with the fact 
that both President Akayev and President Bakiyev were forcefully ousted 
from office amid widespread public perceptions that the United States had 
supported the regimes’ repression and fueled—I say that without any pun 
intended—their corrosive corruption.51 
During the hearing, witnesses informed the U.S. House of 
Representatives of “numerous red flags of the sort traditionally used by 
[the] Department of Justice when looking at bribery cases relating to public 
contracts” and strongly suggesting that the conduct at Manas involved 
FCPA violations.52 
Specifically, the House learned how various contracts involving U.S. 
business organizations Red Star and Mina Corp. were structured and how 
these organizations received in excess of $1 billion in refuel supply 
contracts.53  According to the testimony of Scott Horton (who was, among 
other things, a member of the Board of the National Institute of Military 
Justice and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations): 
[There] are very disturbing questions concerning these companies.  They 
appear to have come out of nowhere with no prior track record of 
involvement in this sector; the individuals involved with them have 
copious connections to the U.S. Government, but not really very much to 
the fuel supply industry; and the contracting relationships themselves are, 
in a word, extraordinary, not consistent with traditional contracting rule 
[sic] and approaches.54 
Relevant to the Manas fuel contracts, the official FCPA Guidance 
released by the government identifies the following red flags associated 
with contracting:  when a party “is in a different line of business than that 
for which it has been engaged” and when a party “is related to or closely 
associated” with government officials.55 
At the hearing, Horton also testified about the alleged indifference of the 
DOJ to the alleged corruption at Manas.  Horton stated: 
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 I also am concerned about the role the U.S. Department of Justice has 
played in this, because after the 2005 revolution, the Justice Department 
did come in, did conduct an investigation, and appears to have given a 
wink and a nod to these arrangements involving Red Star and Mina Corp., 
and I think that raises serious questions in my mind about their 
understanding of this contract corruption issue, particularly because this 
occurs at a time when our Justice Department is telling us that 
procurement contract fraud is a priority for the Department of Justice.  
Indeed, they say it is a national security issue.  And I don’t see how we 
can reconcile the way they have behaved in this case with those sorts of 
statements.56 
It was troubling in the mid-1970’s when Congress learned that certain 
parts of the U.S. government were participants in, or at least enablers of, the 
very problem Congress was seeking to address.  As highlighted by the 
Giffen and Manas examples, it is even more troubling that this problem 
appears to persist today and that the U.S. government seems to condone 
bribery when done with the approval or the wink and nod of one part of the 
U.S. government. 
As highlighted next, it is equally troubling that the identity of the alleged 
bribe payer influenced the U.S. government’s enforcement of bribery laws. 
C.  Inconsistent U.S. Government Enforcement of Bribery Laws 
Equal treatment and absence of discrimination are commonly accepted 
rule of law principles.  These fundamental principles are found in the 
Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (“OECD Convention”) to which the United States is a party.57  
Specifically, Article 5 of the OECD Convention states under the heading 
“Enforcement” that prosecution of bribery offenses “shall not be influenced 
by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon 
relations with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons 
involved.”58 
However, bribery by companies perceived to be otherwise vital to U.S. 
strategic interests seemingly violate these rule of law principles in that such 
companies were not charged with violating the FCPA’s antibribery 
provisions in what can be called bribery, yet no bribery enforcement 
actions.  In addition to the above Giffen and Manas examples—which just 
as easily could be highlighted in this section—this section examines an 
enforcement action against BAE Systems. 
For years, British defense contractor BAE Systems was under intense 
scrutiny concerning allegations that it engaged in widespread bribery and 
corruption, and in 2010, the DOJ filed a criminal information against 
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BAE.59  Among other allegations, the DOJ alleged that BAE “provided 
substantial benefits” to a Saudi Arabian official who was in a position of 
influence regarding contracts for military aircraft and related services.60  
According to the DOJ, BAE provided benefits worth millions of dollars 
such as the purchase of travel and accommodations, securities services, real 
estate, automobiles, and personal items through various payment 
mechanisms both in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and 
elsewhere.61 
Despite the above allegations, the DOJ merely charged BAE with one 
count of conspiracy for “making certain false, inaccurate and incomplete 
statements to the U.S. government and failing to honor certain undertakings 
given to the U.S. government, thereby defrauding the United States” and 
“causing to be filed export license applications with [various U.S. 
government entities] that omitted a material fact” concerning fee and 
commission payments.62 
In other words, BAE was not charged with FCPA antibribery violations 
even though among the false statements BAE was alleged to have made to 
the U.S. government was its commitment not to knowingly violate the 
FCPA.  This was the only mention of the FCPA in the criminal enforcement 
action despite the above allegations that clearly implicated the FCPA’s 
antibribery provisions. 
A key factor the DOJ considered in resolving the case against BAE in the 
way it did was the “collateral consequences” that could have resulted from 
criminal antibribery charges including the risk of debarment and exclusion 
from government contracts.63  BAE did plead guilty to the charged offenses 
and agreed to pay a $400 million fine and thus clearly did not escape 
liability for its egregious conduct.64  Yet, the lack of FCPA antibribery 
violations against BAE was notable.  However, BAE was no ordinary 
company, but rather a major U.S. government contractor, and the DOJ 
specifically noted in the charging documents that the company was the 
largest defense contractor in Europe and the fifth largest in the United 
States as measured by sales.65 
In short, the uncomfortable truth of U.S. bribery enforcement is that 
some of the most egregious FCPA violators, per the DOJ’s own allegations, 
are also some of the largest and most important U.S. government 
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contractors or suppliers of goods and services critical to national security.  
That such companies were not charged with FCPA antibribery violations 
leaves the impression that certain companies that sell certain products or 
services to certain customers are immune from FCPA charges. 
Even more troubling, business seems to continue as usual despite 
allegations of egregious bribery.  For instance, in the immediate aftermath 
of the BAE enforcement action, the FBI (the same agency that investigated 
BAE’s conduct and issued a press release stating that “corporations and 
individuals who conspire to defeat [competition] not only cause harm but 
ultimately shake the public’s confidence in the entire system”) awarded the 
company a $40 million contract.66 
The public’s confidence in enforcement of bribery and corruption laws is 
also shaken by the subtle difference between U.S. government and private 
sector attempts to influence foreign government action. 
D.  The Subtle Difference Between U.S. Government 
and Private Sector Attempts to Influence Foreign Government Action 
Not all uncomfortable truths regarding the U.S. crusade against bribery 
are as obvious as the U.S. government providing bags full of cash to foreign 
government leaders, the highest levels of the U.S. government having 
knowledge of and supporting private bribery, or the U.S. government not 
charging strategically important companies with actual FCPA violations.  
As the below examples demonstrate, the uncomfortable truth is sometimes a 
bit more subtle. 
For instance, during the sentencing of Nam Nguyen, who pleaded guilty 
to violating the FCPA in connection with payments in Vietnam, the DOJ 
called to the witness stand Brent Omdahl, the former U.S. commercial 
attaché from Vietnam, who was asked to testify as to the “seriousness of the 
offense as it impacts Vietnam.”67  In his testimony, Omdahl described both 
how he oversaw a staff of about ten people to deliver services to American 
companies to help them grow their exports and how he managed an 
advocacy portfolio in Vietnam to assist U.S. companies in selling directly to 
the Vietnamese government.68  Omdahl testified that his group “constantly 
advise[d] companies on strategies to enter the market, to bid on government 
contract [sic], [and] to win business.”69 
Omdahl described Vietnam as a “‘corrupt country’ and the DOJ 
presumably expected him to stay on message regarding how corruption in 
Vietnam [was] not a victimless crime and to describe who suffers from 
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corruption in Vietnam.”70  He did that, but Omdahl seemed to drift in his 
testimony when he stated:  “I make no bones about it.  It’s very difficult to 
do business in Vietnam.  It’s not very transparent but American companies 
are making money and there are a number of strategies that companies can 
follow.”71  Omdahl was asked, “Is it possible to do business in Vietnam 
without paying bribes[?]”72  He answered, “[I]t is,”73 and one of the 
strategies he described was the following: 
Often [obtaining Vietnamese government business] may require a 
personal visit by the Ambassador or another high-ranking official to a 
government official or an official of a state-run enterprise.  It could take 
the form of a letter from a high-ranking U.S. government official to 
another official in the Vietnamese government or state-owned 
enterprise.74 
Omdahl then specifically talked about a $180 million commercial 
satellite contract that a Vietnamese “major state-owned enterprise” (SOE) 
awarded to a U.S. company.75  “According to [Omdahl], [the U.S. 
company] (he described the company as ‘one of our clients’) ‘was in a 
competitive position to provide a $180 million commercial satellite to one 
of the major state-owned enterprises.’”76  At this point, the judge asked the 
DOJ attorney, “[W]hat does this have to do with what you said you were 
calling this witness to tell us about?”77  After an exchange between the 
judge and the DOJ attorney, Omdahl finished his testimony by saying: 
The bottom line is, we have been able to help companies work through.  
In this particular case, a European country was offering payment with 
regards to winning the bid but the intervention of the Ambassador with 
the Chairman of [the SOE] and the Minister of Information 
Communications, was a critical element to help the company win the 
business, and they have stated as such.78 
According to public records, Lockheed Martin was the company that 
secured the $180 million contract in Vietnam and it is among the “biggest 
corporate campaign contributors in U.S. politics.”79  Therefore, the 
following questions arise:  Is there a difference between:  (a) when a 
company (or its employees) give something of value to a foreign official to 
obtain or retain business with a foreign government; and (b) when a 
company (or its employees) give something of value to U.S. political parties 
or candidates, or spends millions lobbying the U.S. government, and then 
the U.S. government assists the company to obtain or retain business with a 
foreign government? 
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Consider also U.S. diplomats who act as “marketing agents” for U.S. 
companies and help broker sales with foreign governments.  As detailed by 
the New York Times: 
The king of Saudi Arabia wanted the United States to outfit his personal 
jet with the same high-tech devices as Air Force One.  The president of 
Turkey wanted the Obama administration to let a Turkish astronaut sit in 
on a NASA space flight.  And in Bangladesh, the prime minister pressed 
the State Department to re-establish landing rights at Kennedy 
International Airport in New York.  Each of these government leaders had 
one thing in common:  they were trying to decide whether to buy billions 
of dollars’ worth of commercial jets from [a U.S. company] or its 
European competitor, Airbus.  And United States diplomats were acting 
like marketing agents, offering deals to heads of state and airline 
executives whose decisions could be influenced by price, performance 
and, as with all finicky customers with plenty to spend, perks. . . .  To a 
greater degree than previously known, diplomats are a big part of the sales 
force, according to hundreds of cables released by WikiLeaks, which 
describe politicking and cajoling at the highest levels.80 
The above examples raise the question of whether there is a difference 
between the U.S. government using public taxpayer money to offer or to 
pay a foreign government to induce that government to purchase U.S. 
company product and a company using private shareholder money to offer 
or pay a foreign official to induce the government to purchase its product. 
Similarly, why does the U.S. government construct programs around the 
former and call it “foreign military financing” or “foreign military sales” 
while criminally prosecuting the latter as bribery?81  As to these questions, 
as others have noted, “the [U.S.] government wants to give the impression 
that it is law-abiding and others are not when the same behavior is engaged 
in” by both and that “when the government itself gives bribes to foreign 
countries every day, every day of the week, they just call it foreign aid.”82 
Do the above examples merely demonstrate that the dividing line 
between bribery and no bribery is subtle and dependent on the source of the 
money and influence?  Indeed, it has been noted: 
It’s not that the United States lacks corruption . . . or even pervasive 
corruption.  It’s just not of the low-level and petty variety like the kind [in 
certain emerging markets in places like Africa], not most of the time 
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anyway.  In America, corruption is concentrated at the highest levels of 
society—and it masquerades [under different names].83 
Likewise, the subtle differences between foreign bribery and U.S. bribery 
have been described as follows: 
The idea of corruption . . . is simple bribery—cash changing hands.  It’s 
the proverbial cash in the piano or the freezer.  Corruption is reduced to 
bribery. 
 In fact, today’s most savvy power brokers are engaged in a kind of 
corruption that is much more subtle and more difficult to detect.  Today’s 
most corrupt players, at least in the West, don’t need this quid pro quo 
corruption.  They are far beyond that.  That’s for the little players.  That’s 
for the small fry.84 
Bribery, however, ought to be bribery pure and simple, and subtle 
distinctions should not be drawn based on the source of money or influence.  
Doing so merely creates a distinction without a difference.  Indeed, perhaps 
because of this uncomfortable truth regarding the U.S. crusade against 
bribery, U.S. government enforcement agencies frequently employ 
overblown and inconsistent rhetoric when describing FCPA enforcement. 
E.  The U.S. Government’s Overblown and Inconsistent Rhetoric 
Regarding Bribery Enforcement 
While U.S. government agencies that enforce bribery laws appear to be 
impartial law enforcement agencies, the fact is that such agencies—
particularly the DOJ—are also political actors advancing political interests.  
As long as there has been government, government actors have used 
rhetoric—no matter how off target—to advance political causes.  As 
highlighted below, a final uncomfortable truth regarding the U.S. crusade 
against bribery is the often overblown and inconsistent rhetoric of the DOJ 
in describing its FCPA enforcement program. 
For instance, when describing its FCPA enforcement program, the DOJ 
has frequently invoked the name of Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian man 
whose act of self-immolation in the face of local corruption was generally 
viewed as contributing to the Arab Spring.  The DOJ has stated, “[T]hrough 
our FCPA enforcement, we are also sending a signal to ordinary people—to 
Mohammed Bouazizis across the globe—that we stand with you.”85 
Surely there were many ordinary people impacted by the U.S. 
government sanctioning, acquiescing, or not fully prosecuting the examples 
of bribery highlighted above, yet the U.S. government seemed not “to 
stand” with them.  A recent Ninth Circuit case concerning a Board of 
Immigration appeal is also relevant to the uncomfortable truth highlighted 
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in this section.  In a case concerning an Armenian citizen’s request for 
asylum for exposing corruption, which the DOJ opposed, a judge 
emphasized that the DOJ’s position in the case and other immigration cases 
“clashe[d] with its own campaign against foreign corruption”86 and stated 
“[i]t is unclear why the Justice Department champions the fight against 
foreign corruption while it simultaneously tries to deport those perceived as 
fighting foreign corruption.”87 
Moreover, the DOJ frequently links FCPA enforcement to such classical 
notions of bribery as roads not being built, schools lying in ruins, and basic 
public services going unprovided.88  Such rhetoric certainly has a political 
and populist appeal, and it is not difficult to construct various hypotheticals 
in which bribery can lead to such broad-ranging effects. 
However, the reality is that FCPA enforcement actions typically involve 
companies that are widely viewed as industry leaders selling the best 
product or service for the best price.  Raising this common truth of FCPA 
enforcement is not meant to suggest that industry leaders cannot violate the 
FCPA—they surely can.  Rather, this point is to highlight that a typical 
FCPA enforcement action does not allege or even remotely suggest that the 
product or service at issue was compromised, deficient, or capable of 
causing the broad-ranging effects that the DOJ frequently highlights when 
describing its FCPA enforcement program. 
More recently, the DOJ has described its FCPA enforcement program as 
“necessary” to protect U.S. national security interests.  As stated by the 
current DOJ Assistant Attorney General: 
You may be asking yourself why the U.S. Justice Department is involved 
in the fight against corruption abroad. . . .  The threats posed to the United 
States by international corruption, however, cannot be overlooked.  
Foremost, corrupt countries are less safe.  Corruption thwarts economic 
development, traps entire populations in poverty, and leaves countries 
without a credible justice system.  Corrupt officials who put their personal 
enrichment before the benefit of their citizenry create unstable countries.  
And as we have seen time and again, unstable countries become the 
breeding grounds and safe havens for terrorist groups and other criminals 
who threaten the security of the United States. . . .  For all of these 
reasons, fighting foreign corruption is not a service we provide to the 
global community, but rather a necessary enforcement action to protect 
our own national security interests.89 
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Surely terrorists and other criminals are corrupt, but it does not therefore 
follow that enforcement of the FCPA is necessarily linked to U.S. national 
security.  Indeed, the vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
are the result of corporate voluntary disclosures in which the DOJ and SEC 
merely process the disclosures.90 
Moreover, there is seemingly no credible and direct link between the 
bulk of FCPA enforcement actions and U.S. national security interests.  For 
instance, in recent years approximately fifteen corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions have concerned business relationships with foreign physicians, lab 
personnel, and even a midwife based on the enforcement theory that such 
foreign healthcare workers are “foreign officials” under the FCPA and thus 
similar to Presidents and Prime Ministers.91  In addition, a substantial 
percentage of FCPA enforcement actions concern alleged conduct in 
connection with navigating foreign government bureaucracy in obtaining 
foreign licenses, permits, and certifications.92  Moreover, several FCPA 
enforcement actions have involved allegations about bottles of wine, 
kitchen appliances, tea sets, karaoke bars, and flowers.93 
Also relevant to the overblown rhetoric of linking FCPA enforcement to 
national security is the fact that most corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
concern conduct that allegedly occurred approximately five to seven years 
prior to the enforcement action and, in certain cases, approximately ten to 
twenty years prior to the enforcement action when U.S. national security 
concerns were materially different.94 
Not only is linking FCPA enforcement to national security overblown, 
but perhaps most importantly, it is inconsistent with the FCPA’s actual 
provisions.  Indeed, as a matter of law, U.S. national security is a reason not 
to enforce the FCPA. 
The FCPA states: 
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With respect to matters concerning the national security of the United 
States, no duty or liability under [certain FCPA provisions] shall be 
imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the head of any 
Federal department or agency responsible for such matters if such act in 
cooperation with such head of a department or agency was done upon the 
specific, written directive of the head of such department or agency 
pursuant to Presidential authority to issue such directives.95 
Indeed, as highlighted above regarding the Giffen, Manas, and BAE 
examples, U.S. national security seemed to be a reason not to enforce the 
FCPA as a matter of practice.96 
In short, whether it is the U.S. government being an active participant in 
bribery, private bribery being engaged in with the knowledge and support 
of the highest levels of the U.S. government, the U.S. government not 
enforcing bribery laws against strategically important companies, the subtle 
difference between U.S. government and private sector attempts to 
influence foreign government action, or the U.S. government’s use of 
overblown and inconsistent rhetoric regarding bribery enforcement, Part II 
of this Article highlighted several uncomfortable truths regarding the U.S. 
crusade against bribery.  As highlighted in Part III below, the U.S. crusade 
against bribery also suffers from several double standards. 
III.  THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT 
The FCPA was modeled after the preexisting U.S. domestic bribery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, and as mentioned above, the government has 
recognized that it “could not be effective abroad if [it] did not lead by 
example here at home.”97  As the table below shows, both statutes share 
common core elements. 
 
Core Elements 
 
FCPA Domestic Bribery Statute 
Anything of Value Anything of Value
To a “Foreign Official” To a “Public Official”
To “Obtain or Retain Business” To “Influence Any Official Act” 
 
Despite such similarities, corporate interaction with “foreign officials” 
seems to be subject to greater scrutiny and different standards of 
enforcement than corporate interaction with similarly situated U.S. actors.  
As discussed in this section, this double standard manifests itself in several 
situations including:  (i) a variety of direct and indirect corporate 
 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(A) (2012).  That this provision specifically invokes the 
FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions but not the FCPA’s antibribery 
provisions would seem to be a scrivener’s error. 
 96. See supra notes 43–55 and accompanying text. 
 97. Breuer, supra note 2. 
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interactions with U.S. political actors; (ii) corporate interaction with U.S. 
healthcare providers; and (iii) corporate hiring practices. 
A.  Corporate Interaction with U.S. Political Actors 
In recent years, there have been several FCPA enforcement actions 
concerning corporate payments to foreign political parties and campaigns, 
corporate lobbying of foreign governments, corporate interactions with 
foreign law enforcement agencies, and corporate charitable giving. 
For instance, several FCPA enforcement actions have alleged payments 
to Nigerian political parties.98  Likewise, an FCPA enforcement action 
against Titan Corporation concerned allegations that it made “payment of 
more than $2 million, through an agent in the Republic of Benin, towards 
the election campaign of Benin’s then-incumbent President.”99 
Regarding corporate lobbying of foreign governments, Monsanto 
resolved an FCPA enforcement action based on allegations that it “hired an 
Indonesian consulting company” that provided things of value to an 
Indonesian official to have the Indonesian government “amend or repeal the 
requirement [in Indonesian law] for an environmental impact statement” 
before authorizing the cultivation of genetically modified crops.100 
As to corporate interactions with foreign law enforcement agencies, Pride 
International resolved an FCPA enforcement action based on allegations 
that company employees indirectly provided things of value to an Indian 
administrative judicial tribunal judge “to secure a favorable judicial 
decision for [a branch of a subsidiary] relating to a litigation matter pending 
before the official.”101 
Regarding corporate charitable giving, pharmaceutical companies 
Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly both resolved FCPA enforcement actions 
based on allegations that contributions were made to a bona fide Polish 
foundation dedicated to restoring historic castles.102  Nevertheless, the 
 
 98. See, e.g., Information at 7–8, United States v. Bilfinger SE (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/12/12/bilfinger-
information.pdf [http://perma.cc/WVR5-SE65]; Information, United States v. Marubeni 
Corp., No. 12-CR-022 (S.D. Tex. Jan 17, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/01/24/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
RFT2-ZUFH]. 
 99. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Att’y for the S. Dist. of Cal. (Mar. 1, 2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-pr-plea.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/FM8E-DUE9]. 
 100. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing 
Indonesian Government Official:  Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm_008.htm [http://perma.cc/63UP 
-XES4]. 
 101. Information at 14, United States v. Pride International Inc., No. 10-766 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/ 
16/11-04-10pride-intl-info.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4DU-UDX6]. 
 102. Information at 4, SEC v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 12-cv-02045 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 
2012), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-273.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/JBL9-VVS2]. 
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government alleged that the foundation was “founded and administered”103 
by the director of a government health fund who “exercised considerable 
influence over which pharmaceutical products[,] local hospitals[,] and other 
healthcare providers in the region purchased.”104  In a similar FCPA 
enforcement action, the government alleged that Alstom violated the FCPA 
by, among other things, making a $2.2 million payment to “a U.S.-based 
Islamic education foundation associated with [an alleged ‘foreign official’ 
with decision-making responsibility].”105 
Against this FCPA enforcement landscape, consider the following 
examples: 
 
i.  A President is actively seeking and accepting corporate money to 
fund his inaugural festivities. 
 
ii.  A high-profile corporate executive hosts a $40,000 per person 
dinner that raises $15 million for the President and personally 
writes a $2 million check to an organization that is supporting the 
President. 
 
iii.  Various companies make large donations—some in the millions 
of dollars—to a family foundation of a high-ranking government 
official whose office has substantial discretion over pending 
transactions involving the companies. 
 
iv.  A billionaire business executive bankrolls a high-ranking 
politician’s campaign, finances the politician’s legislative 
agenda, and subsidizes the politician’s personal finances. 
 
v.  A pharmaceutical company faces pending government restraints 
that could negatively affect its business.  Thus, the company 
turns to its lobbyists, who include former chiefs of staff to 
various current government officials on a key congressional 
committee.  Furthermore, in recent years the company indirectly 
has given thousands of dollars to current government officials 
and otherwise made large donations to groups favored by current 
government officials.  Thereafter, the government officials insert 
a paragraph into a massive spending bill that, while not 
 
 103. Complaint, supra note 93, at 3; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and 
Company with FCPA Violations (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/ 
Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116#.VOTt3PnF91Y [http://perma.cc/E6KC-KFJT]. 
 104. Complaint, supra note 93, at 4; see Litigation Release No. 18740, SEC, SEC Files 
Settled Enforcement Action Against Schering-Plough Corporation for Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Violations (June 9, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
lr18740.htm [http://perma.cc/EV5Q-6EGT]. 
 105. Information at 23, United States v. Alstom S.A., No. 14-cr-00246-JBA (D. Conn. 
Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alstomsa/DE-1-Information 
-for-SA.pdf [http://perma.cc/P7LN-65L3]. 
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specifically mentioning the company, strongly favors one of the 
company’s drugs.  The effect of the paragraph in the bill gives 
the company two additional years to sell the drug without 
government price controls. 
 
vi.  Various companies, facing various law enforcement 
investigations, retain paid lobbyists to wine, dine, and make 
substantial campaign contributions to the chief prosecutors 
heading up the law enforcement investigations. 
 
vii.  A company makes a $71,000 charitable donation to an 
organization in which a public official in its jurisdiction is a 
longtime board member.  For each of the past five years, the 
same company has given $25,000 to an institute named for the 
late mother of another public official who chairs a key 
congressional committee overseeing the company’s industry.  In 
the aggregate over a two-year period, the company gives 
approximately $1.6 million to various charities affiliated with 
lawmakers or executive branch officials.  Over the same two-
year period, other companies in the same industry also have 
given in the aggregate approximately $1.35 million to the same 
public officials. 
 
viii.  A company learns of potential legislation that will negatively 
affect its business.  Thus, a company representative begs a 
government official who heads a key congressional committee 
that will decide the fate of the legislation to vote in a way that 
serves the company’s interest.  The company also spends 
millions to influence the legislative body.  The government 
official reverses his prior position and votes in a way that serves 
the company’s interest.  One month later, the company’s CEO 
and the government official appear at an event where the 
company announces it is making a $30 million charitable 
donation—$11 million of which will benefit schools in the 
government official’s district—the largest gift ever to the city’s 
schools. 
 
A prudent FCPA professional would likely see the red flags in all of the 
above scenarios and counsel the companies at issue to conduct an internal 
investigation of the underlying conduct.  Indeed, the official FCPA 
Guidance released by the government states as follows concerning gifts: 
An improper benefit can take many forms.  While cases often involve 
payments of cash (sometimes in the guise of “consulting fees” or 
“commissions” given through intermediaries), others have involved travel 
expenses and expensive gifts.  Like the domestic bribery statute, the 
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FCPA does not contain a minimum threshold amount for corrupt gifts or 
payments.106 
The FCPA Guidance further states that companies “cannot use the 
pretense of charitable contributions as a way to funnel bribes to government 
officials.”107 
But wait.  The government officials in all of the above actual scenarios 
were not “foreign officials”—they were U.S. government officials! 
Example (i) describes President Barack Obama’s 2013 inaugural 
festivities in which the President’s “finance team [offered] corporations and 
other institutions that contribute $1 million exclusive access to an array of 
inaugural festivities” with different packages offering “differ[ent] levels of 
access depending on the level of contribution.”108 
Example (ii) describes a movie company executive’s political 
contributions and close ties to President Obama, including his hosting a 
campaign event.109  According to the Wall Street Journal, the Executive’s 
“fundraising prowess has earned him access and a role as the informal 
liaison between Hollywood and the White House, as the industry continues 
seeking government help against online piracy” among other issues.110  Of 
particular note regarding this example, the movie executive’s company, like 
other Hollywood studios, is currently the subject of FCPA scrutiny 
concerning potential inappropriate payments and interactions with Chinese 
government officials with discretion over aspects of the film industry.111 
Example (iii) concerns allegations raised in a New York Times article 
regarding former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and numerous donations 
made to the Clinton Foundation by companies who sought approval from 
the State Department concerning various business transactions.112 
Example (iv) describes a billionaire’s relationship with U.S. Senator and 
presidential candidate Marco Rubio.  According to the New York Times: 
[The billionaire] has left few corners of Mr. Rubio’s world untouched.  
He hired Mr. Rubio, then a Senate candidate, as a lawyer; employed his 
 
 106. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC, supra note 55, at 14–15. 
 107. Id. at 16. 
 108. Sheryl Stolberg, For Corporate Donors, Inauguration Details, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/us/politics/obama-team-outlines-four-corporate-
donor-packages-for-inauguration.html?_r=3& [http://perma.cc/2WE6-BJ4D]. 
 109. Peter Nicholas and Erica Orden, Movie Mogul’s Starring Role in Raising Funds for 
Obama, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390 
443571904577630430778711196 [http://perma.cc/FG8A-W26H]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-38 [http://perma.cc/R9GP-THPN]. 
 112. Wilson Andrews, Donations to the Clinton Foundation, and a Russian Uranium 
Takeover, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04 
/23/us/clinton-foundation-donations-uranium-investors.html?_r=3 [http://perma.cc/KR2B-
24UC]; see also Michael Patrick Leahy, Legal Expert on Whether Donations to Clinton 
Foundation Are Bribes:  If It ‘Quacks Like a Duck, Chances Are It Is a Duck’, BREITBART 
NEWS (May 29, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/05/29/legal-expert-
on-whether-donations-to-clinton-foundation-are-bribes-of-hillary-if-it-quacks-like-a-duck-
chances-are-its-a-duck/ [http://perma.cc/6M28-E8MA]. 
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wife to advise the [the billionaire’s] family’s philanthropic foundation; 
helped cover the cost of Mr. Rubio’s salary as an instructor at a Miami 
college; and gave Mr. Rubio access to his private plane.  The money has 
flowed both ways.  Mr. Rubio has steered taxpayer funds to [the 
billionaire’s] favored causes, successfully pushing for an $80 million state 
grant to finance a genomics center at a private university and securing $5 
million for cancer research at a Miami institute for which [the billionaire] 
is a major donor.  Even in an era dominated by super-wealthy donors, [the 
billionaire] stands out, given how integral he has been not only to Mr. 
Rubio’s political aspirations but also to his personal finances. . . .  Pressed 
on his financial ties to [the billionaire], Mr. Rubio said in an interview 
that he saw no ethical issue.  “What is the conflict?” he asked.  “I don’t 
ever recall [the billionaire] ever asking for anything for himself.”  He 
acknowledged that [the billionaire] had approached him about state aid 
for projects, such as funding for cancer research, but said that he had 
supported the proposals on their merits.113 
Example (v) describes the courting of various members of the Senate 
Finance Committee by a biotechnology firm.  According to the New York 
Times, the company “which has a small army of 74 lobbyists in the capital, 
was the only company to argue aggressively” for the legislative change.114 
Example (vi) describes interactions of various companies with U.S. state 
attorneys general.115  According to the New York Times, “Attorneys general 
are now the object of aggressive pursuit by lobbyists and lawyers who use 
campaign contributions, personal appeals at lavish corporate-sponsored 
conferences and other means to push them to drop investigations, change 
policies, negotiate favorable settlements or pressure federal regulators.”116 
Example (vii) describes the charitable giving practice of a major U.S. 
telecommunications company and other companies in the same industry.117  
The Philadelphia Inquirer quoted the company spokesperson as saying “[i]t 
is offensive to suggest our long-term support of community organizations is 
in any way tied to governmental decisions.”118  The article further quoted 
the U.S. public official whose late mother’s institute received the donation 
 
 113. Michael Barbaro and Steve Eder, Business Ties Made by Jeb Bush As Florida 
Governor Turned Lucrative When He Left Office, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/business-ties-made-by-bush-as-florida-governor-
turned-lucrative-when-he-left-office.html?ref=business&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/B7T6-7NQ2]. 
 114. Eric Lipton & Kevin Sack, Fiscal Footnote:  Big Senate Gift to Drug Maker, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/us/medicare-pricing-delay-is-
political-win-for-amgen-drug-maker.html [http://perma.cc/M3HU-W387]. 
 115. Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attorneys-
general.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region 
=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/6HUG-89VH]. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Jonathan Tamari, Comcast’s Charity Extends to Friends and Potential Foes, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (July 29, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-07-29/news/52144872_1_comcast-
foundation-sena-fitzmaurice-comcast-officials [http://perma.cc/Z86Q-HHX3]. 
 118. Id. 
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as saying, “You don’t seek . . . .  If you’re in a position like I am, you 
sometimes get.”119 
Example (viii) describes a U.S. company’s potential tax exposure and its 
interactions with a U.S. public official and his district.120  The New York 
Times quoted a company spokesperson who said that the donation “was 
granted solely on the merit of the project.”121  For his part, the U.S. public 
official, who was previously censured “for soliciting donations from 
corporations and executives with business before his committee,” said “that 
the donation was unrelated to his official actions.”122 
If any of the above scenarios involved “foreign officials,” there would 
likely be an FCPA investigation of the companies involved.  However, 
because the above scenarios involved U.S. officials, there is a slim chance 
that the government will investigate any of the above companies though the 
domestic bribery statute has core elements similar to the FCPA. 
But the question is why?  Some might be inclined to say that while our 
system is not perfect, that is just how the system works.  But why should 
the government subject business interactions with “foreign officials” to 
different standards than business interactions with U.S. officials?  Why do 
we reflexively label a “foreign official” who receives “things of value” 
from private business interests as corrupt, yet generally turn a blind eye 
when it happens here at home?  Is the FCPA enforced too aggressively or is 
enforcement of the U.S. domestic bribery statute too lax?  Ought not there 
be some consistency between enforcement of the FCPA and the domestic 
bribery statute? 
Indeed, as relevant to the Hillary Clinton example above,123 Secretary of 
State Clinton remarked: 
[T]his Administration, like those before us, has taken a strong stand when 
it comes to American companies bribing foreign officials.  We are 
unequivocally opposed to weakening the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
We don’t need to lower our standards.  We need to work with other 
countries to raise theirs.124 
While pondering these questions, consider that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has specifically endorsed the legality of the conduct highlighted in several 
of the U.S. examples above.  In both Citizens United v. FEC125 and 
McCutcheon v. FEC126 (cases dealing with various aspects of campaign 
finance laws), the Supreme Court stated:  “Ingratiation and access . . . are 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. David Kociensiewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html?hp=& 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XL6S-B7RP]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 124. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Transparency International-USA’s 
Annual Integrity Award Dinner (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/ 
20092013clinton/rm/2012/03/186703.htm [http://perma.cc/5U4E-82TP]. 
 125. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 126. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
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not corruption.”127  Likewise, the D.C. Circuit recently stated the following 
about corporate lobbying: 
 Lobbying has been integral to the American political system since its 
very inception. . . . 
 In order to more effectively communicate their clients’ policy goals, 
lobbyists often seek to cultivate personal relationships with public 
officials.  This involves not only making campaign contributions, but 
sometimes also hosting events or providing gifts of value such as drinks, 
meals, and tickets to sporting events and concerts.128 
However, it is difficult to square the above judicial logic with the 
allegations in the above FCPA enforcement actions which do equate 
“ingratiation and access,” with a certain type of public official, or providing 
various things of value to a certain type of public official, as corruption. 
Indeed, President Jimmy Carter recently termed unchecked political 
contributions in the United States as “legal bribery of candidates.”129  
Recall that President Carter signed the FCPA into law in 1977 and was 
praised for doing so.  Why should our reaction to President Carter speaking 
out about another form of bribery today be any different? 
At the very least, the actual U.S. scenarios highlighted above should 
cause us to pause and reflect whether, in the words of the DOJ, “we in the 
United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-
corruption”130 or on the “right side of history.”131 
B.  Corporate Interaction with U.S. Healthcare Providers 
As highlighted in Part II, Congress’s main motivation in passing the 
FCPA was the foreign policy implications of corporate payments to 
government officials such as the Prime Minister of Japan, the President of 
the Republic of Korea, the President of Honduras, the President of Gabon, 
and Italian political parties.132 
However, the alleged “foreign officials” in several recent FCPA 
enforcement actions bear little resemblance to government officials.  
Rather, the alleged “foreign officials” are physicians, nurses, lab personnel, 
and others associated with various foreign healthcare systems that are 
allegedly state owned or state controlled.133  This enforcement theory was 
first used in an FCPA enforcement action in 2002 and has since become a 
dominant theory used, in whole or in part, in approximately fifteen 
 
 127. Id. at 1441 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360). 
 128. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 129. Ray Henry, Jimmy Carter:  Unchecked Political Contributions Are ‘Legal Bribery’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmy-
carter-bribery_n_3611882.html [http://perma.cc/JDW4-MXKR]. 
 130. See Breuer, supra note 1. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Koehler, supra note 10, at 934–35. 
 133. See Koehler, supra note 91; Mike Koehler, As Foreign Scrutiny Grows, Dollars 
Continue to Flow in the U.S., FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor. 
com/as-foreign-scrutiny-grows-dollars-continue-to-flow-in-the-u-s [http://perma.cc/YKM7-
KQEB]. 
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corporate FCPA enforcement actions.134  For instance, the following 
actions included allegations that a company subject to the FCPA provided 
various things of value to such alleged “foreign officials”: 
 
 An enforcement action against Biomet, Inc. included allegations 
that the company paid royalties to Argentine physicians and for 
travel of Chinese physicians.135 
 
 An enforcement action against Orthofix International N.V. 
included allegations that the company provided various gifts such 
as vacation packages, televisions, and laptops to Mexican 
healthcare workers.136 
 
 An enforcement action against Eli Lilly Co. included allegations 
that the company provided various gifts such as meals, wine, 
visits to bath houses, card games, specialty foods, door prizes, 
spa treatments, cigarettes, and visits to karaoke bars to Chinese 
physicians.137 
 
 An enforcement action against Stryker Corp. included allegations 
that the company provided travel benefits to Polish and 
Romanian physicians.138 
 
 An enforcement action against Pfizer Inc. included allegations 
that the company provided travel benefits to Croatian physicians; 
hospitality, gifts, and support for international travel to Chinese 
physicians; international travel and recreational opportunities to 
Czech physicians; and gifts and support for domestic and 
international travel to Italian physicians.139 
 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Biomet, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-biomet (containing links to original source 
documents) [http://perma.cc/MYS8-8K4U]. 
 136. See Mike Koehler, Orthofix International Resolves Enforcement Action Based on the 
Conduct of Its Mexican Subsidiary, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 12, 2012), http://www. 
fcpaprofessor.com/orthofix-international-resolves-enforcement-action-based-on-the-
conduct-of-its-mexican-subsidiary (containing links to original source documents) [http:// 
perma.cc/U44H-EJPZ]. 
 137. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Eli Lilly, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-eli-lilly (containing links to original source 
documents) [http://perma.cc/T9PH-4FLW]. 
 138. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Stryker, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-stryker (containing links to original source 
documents) [http://perma.cc/5EZD-ALRM]. 
 139. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Pfizer, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-pfizer (containing links to original source 
documents) [http://perma.cc/H8DA-TGEZ]. 
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 An enforcement action against Johnson & Johnson included 
allegations that the company provided travel to medical 
conventions for Polish physicians as well as travel and other gifts 
to Romanian physicians.140 
 
Largely because of the prominent use of nonprosecution agreements 
(NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) in resolving corporate 
FCPA enforcement actions, the above theory that various foreign healthcare 
workers are “foreign officials” under the FCPA has never been subjected to 
judicial scrutiny.141  Perhaps most telling as to its validity, the DOJ has 
never charged an individual based on this FCPA enforcement theory.142 
In addition to numerous actual FCPA enforcement actions, the theory 
that physicians, nurses, lab personnel, and others associated with foreign 
healthcare systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA is also the reason 
why several additional companies are the subject of ongoing FCPA 
scrutiny.143 
Yet as this foreign scrutiny of pharmaceutical and other healthcare 
related companies continues, the dollars continue to flow to physicians and 
others associated with U.S. healthcare systems.  For instance, in 2014 the 
Wall Street Journal published a series of articles based on information from 
a new federal government transparency initiative mandated in the 2010 
Affordable Care Act that required manufacturers of drugs and medical 
devices to disclose the payments they make to physicians and teaching 
hospitals every year.144  One article reported: 
 The payments and so-called transfers of value to an estimated 546,000 
doctors and 1,360 teaching hospitals include such items as free meals that 
company sales representatives bring to physicians’ offices, fees paid to 
doctors to speak about a company’s drug to other doctors at restaurants, 
compensation for clinical trial research and consulting fees. 
 Some doctors have earned tens of thousands of dollars annually from 
drug companies by flying to various cities to give paid speeches, while 
 
 140. See Mike Koehler, Johnson & Johnson Enforcement Action Focuses on Health Care 
Providers As “Foreign Officials”, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 11, 2011), http://www. 
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some surgeons received even larger amounts from medical-device makers, 
partly from royalties on products they helped develop.145 
Another article reported: 
 Drug and medical-device makers paid $6.49 billion to U.S. doctors and 
teaching hospitals during 2014, according to the federal government’s 
first full-year accounting of the breadth of industry financial ties with 
medical providers. 
 The tally comprises company payments to more than 600,000 doctors 
and 1,100 hospitals for services such as consulting, research and 
promotional speeches about drugs, as well as the value of free meals 
provided to doctors by sales reps pitching products. . . .  Payments for 
food, beverages, travel and lodging amounted to $403.64 million, the vast 
majority of it in in-kind payments.  Details of some payments for 
miscellaneous “entertainment” included a $65 massage at an airport, 
Alcatraz tickets and a $2,000 payment for a training seminar in the 
Cayman Islands.146 
Things of value are also being provided to U.S. physicians and others 
associated with U.S. healthcare systems in connection with specific 
contemplated business transactions.  For instance: 
 As it fights to buy Botox maker Allergan Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals 
International Inc. is investing cash and time wooing the doctors it would 
need on its side after a takeover. 
 A centerpiece of the effort:  Valeant said it met with a total of 45 
influential cosmetic surgeons and dermatologists in September at events 
in Aspen, Colo., and Palm Beach, Fla.  Valeant paid for the physicians’ 
airfares, two-night stays at luxury hotels and meals.  The company also 
agreed to provide consulting fees that could amount to as much as 
$30,000, according to doctors who attended the meetings.147 
Many of the above things of value provided to U.S. physicians are 
obviously similar to those alleged in FCPA enforcement actions involving 
foreign physicians and other healthcare personnel.  So what’s the difference 
between the U.S. conduct and the foreign conduct alleged in several FCPA 
enforcement actions?  If the answer is that the FCPA enforcement actions 
involved “foreign officials,” this is correct to the extent the government 
alleged that physicians and other healthcare workers of various foreign 
healthcare systems were “foreign officials” even though there is seemingly 
no legal support for this position.  However, given that approximately 20 
percent of hospitals in the United States are owned by state or local 
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government,148 and that an additional 150 medical centers are operated by 
the Veterans Health Administration,149 it stands to reason that certain things 
of value provided to U.S. physicians are to individuals associated with U.S. 
government-owned or -controlled hospitals. 
Yet again one should not hold their breath waiting for enforcement 
actions under the domestic bribery statute concerning the U.S. payments.  
Again, the question is why?  Assuming that foreign physicians and 
healthcare personnel are indeed “foreign officials” under the FCPA, why 
should corporate interaction with such “foreign officials” be subject to 
greater scrutiny and different standards of enforcement than corporate 
interaction with similarly situated U.S. parties?  Indeed, in the minds of 
some, “the most corrupt health system globally is that in the [United 
States].”150  Relevant to the double standard issue highlighted in this 
section, it has been  asked whether the United States should “be policing 
health care overseas under the guise of the ‘foreign official’ enforcement 
theory,” or should the United States be “policing it by redefining how 
businesses operate in the [United States] as a starting point and then 
applying those standards overseas?”151 
The double standard of bribery enforcement manifests itself not only 
through corporate interaction with U.S. political actors and healthcare 
providers, but also in connection with corporate hiring practices as 
highlighted in the next section. 
C.  Corporate Hiring Practices 
As long as there have been public officials, the children of officials have 
often been valued by private sector employers.  This dynamic is present 
both in the United States and abroad.  However, while the former seems to 
be accepted, recent events have indicated that the latter is often investigated 
as bribery. 
For instance, in August 2013 the New York Times reported that “[f]ederal 
authorities have opened a bribery investigation into whether JPMorgan 
Chase hired the children of powerful Chinese officials [so-called 
princelings] to help the bank win lucrative business . . . .”152  As stated in 
the article: 
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 In one instance, the bank hired the son of a former Chinese banking 
regulator who is now the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a state-
controlled financial conglomerate . . . .  After the chairman’s son came on 
board, JPMorgan secured multiple coveted assignments from the Chinese 
conglomerate, including advising a subsidiary of the company on a stock 
offering, records show. 
 The Hong Kong office of JPMorgan also hired the daughter of a 
Chinese railway official.  That official was later detained on accusations 
of doling out government contracts in exchange for cash bribes, the 
government document and public records show. 
 The former official’s daughter came to JPMorgan at an opportune time 
for the New York-based bank:  The China Railway Group, a state-
controlled construction company that builds railways for the Chinese 
government, was in the process of selecting JPMorgan to advise on its 
plans to become a public company, a common move in China for 
businesses affiliated with the government.153 
The U.S. government investigation of JPMorgan soon expanded to 
countries across Asia and involved scrutinizing not only full-time workers, 
but also company interns.154  As often is the case in the FCPA context when 
one company is under investigation, U.S. authorities soon began an industry 
sweep of other financial services companies and their hiring practices in 
Asia.155  Among the other banks publicly reported to be under FCPA 
scrutiny are:  Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup Inc., Credit 
Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan 
Stanley, and UBS AG.156 
The FCPA scrutiny of the financial services industry spawned much 
commentary relevant to double standard issues.  A column in the Economist 
noted: 
 Connections also count in the West, of course.  Following initial 
reports of the SEC’s investigation in the New York Times, a flood of 
stories have noted the jobs held in politically sensitive American firms by 
the sprogs of American politicians. . . . 
 If the regulators genuinely fret about why firms make hiring decisions, 
they may want to extend their inquiries to Washington, DC, and New 
York as well.157 
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A column in the New York Times likewise noted, “[H]iring the sons and 
daughters of powerful executives and politicians is hardly just the province 
of banks doing business in China:  it has been a time-tested practice here in 
the United States.”158 
Some of the most forceful commentary came from respected former 
high-ranking U.S. officials.  For instance, former SEC Commissioner 
Arthur Levitt penned a column in the Wall Street Journal calling the FCPA 
scrutiny of the financial services industry “scurrilous and hypocritical.”159  
In pertinent part, Levitt stated: 
[A]ccording to financial regulators now looking into the hiring practices 
of major U.S. banks and multinationals in China—some of which have 
employed members of influential Chinese families—anyone who once 
hired me [(Levitt’s father was the New York State Comptroller)] might 
have been violating ethical and legal standards.  Securities and Exchange 
Commission regulators now suggest that such hiring overseas is a form of 
untoward influence, akin to bribing foreign officials to win business.  The 
accusation is scurrilous and hypocritical.  If you walk the halls of any 
institution in the U.S.—Congress, federal courthouses, large corporations, 
the White House, American embassies and even the offices of the SEC—
you are likely to run into friends and family members of powerful and 
wealthy people. . . .  Whether this is right or wrong, unfair or fair, is not 
the point.  It is hypocritical of financial regulators to criticize—even 
penalize—practices abroad that are commonplace in Washington, New 
York and other seats of political and economic power.  Were the SEC to 
be completely consistent in its approach, it would have to come down 
hard on the same practices here in the U.S.  And the agency would have a 
field day.  Members of Congress and the executive branch regularly hire 
the children of major donors.160 
Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich was equally forceful.  In a Huffington 
Post column, Reich stated: 
[L]et’s get real.  How different is bribing China’s “princelings,” as they’re 
called there, from Wall Street’s ongoing program of hiring departing U.S. 
Treasury officials, presumably in order to grease the wheels of official 
Washington? . . .  Or, for that matter, how different is what JP Morgan did 
in China from Wall Street’s habit of hiring the children of powerful 
American politicians?161 
Indeed, there are numerous examples of children of powerful American 
politicians securing lucrative jobs and other positions.  For example, 
consider Chelsea Clinton (the only child of former President Bill Clinton 
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and Hillary Clinton, among other things the former Secretary of State and 
current Presidential candidate).  Upon graduating from college, Ms. Clinton 
worked first at McKinsey & Co., a prestigious management consulting firm, 
and thereafter at Avenue Capital Group, a hedge fund run by an individual 
close to the Clinton family and a long-time donor to Democrats.162  Next, 
Ms. Clinton was appointed a corporate director at IAC/InterActiveCorp, a 
media company controlled by an individual who supported both President 
Bill Clinton’s and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns.163  As a 
corporate director, Ms. Clinton reportedly was paid $50,000 per year and 
the company granted her $250,000 worth of company shares.164  Most 
recently, Ms. Clinton (an individual with no apparent professional 
journalism experience) was hired as a “special correspondent” at NBC 
News and reportedly received an annual salary of $600,000.165 
Consider also Jeb Bush (the son of former President George H.W. Bush, 
the brother of former President George W. Bush, and also the former 
Governor of Florida and current Presidential candidate).  As recently 
highlighted by the New York Times: 
 As Mr. Bush sought to create a personal fortune for himself and his 
family after eight years in public office, he found a ready source of 
income:  speeches sponsored by corporations and industry trade groups, 
including some that benefited from his administration’s policies. 
 Since 2007, Mr. Bush has delivered about 260 paid speeches, earning 
around $10 million in the process, according to records provided this 
week by his presidential campaign.  The speeches, combined with his 
consulting and investment businesses, rapidly transformed his finances:  
His and his wife’s net worth soared to at least $19 million from $1.3 
million over the past eight years. 
 The wealth he amassed from the speaking circuit pales in comparison 
to that collected by Hillary Rodham Clinton, a Democratic candidate.  But 
it underscores the ease with which political figures can turn their public 
prominence into private riches.166 
Notably, the recent release of Jeb Bush’s tax returns reveals that “[o]ver 
about six years as an adviser for the defunct Wall Street bank Lehman Bros. 
and later Barclays PLC, Mr. Bush earned, on average, between $1.3 million 
and $2 million.”167 
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In response to the FCPA scrutiny of the financial services industry 
concerning alleged hiring practices of family members of foreign officials, 
FCPA practitioners published client alerts and other publications regarding 
best practices.168  The following best practices were rightly noted: 
 
 “Check the educational and professional qualifications of the 
individual being considered for employment and ensure that they 
are appropriate for the position being filled.  Evidence that a 
relative of a government official was hired into a position for 
which he or she was not qualified will likely result in a finding 
that they were hired for improper purposes.”169 
 
 “Ensure that the salary and treatment given to the relative of the 
government official is commensurate with the position and 
consistent with other individuals in a similar position.  Evidence 
that the relative of the government official is receiving a salary 
significantly higher than other individuals at a similar level and 
occupying similar positions suggests the additional funds may be 
provided to influence the related government official.”170 
 
 “Confirm that the position was not created specifically for the 
relative of the government official.  Evidence that the position 
was created for a specific person will suggest that the company’s 
sole purpose in hiring the individual was to gain influence with 
the government official.”171 
 
 “An individual whose sole qualification for a prestigious Wall 
Street gig is a powerful mother or father in the . . . government 
should raise red flags.” If an individual “is not otherwise 
qualified for the position at [a] financial services company, the 
DOJ and SEC will ask about the basis for the hiring.”172 
 
If the above best practices questions were asked in connection with 
Chelsea Clinton’s various positions or Jeb Bush’s adviser positions with 
Wall Street banks, what would the answers be? 
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In short, there are princelings in the United States as well as individuals 
who bounce in and out of politics and “private” life so often that they are 
effectively part of the political class regardless of the precise moment in 
time in which the question is posed.  Returning to former Labor Secretary 
Reich’s observations about the FCPA scrutiny of the financial services 
industry, Reich asked, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is 
important . . . and JP Morgan should be nailed for bribing Chinese officials.  
But, if you’ll pardon me for asking, why isn’t there a Domestic Corrupt 
Practices Act?”173 
As highlighted above, there is indeed a “domestic corrupt practices 
act”—it is called 18 U.S.C. § 201 and it has similar core elements to the 
FCPA.  Time will tell whether the industry sweep of Asian hiring practices 
of financial services companies results in any FCPA enforcement 
actions.174  However, it is safe to assume that there will be no domestic 
bribery prosecutions based on similar corporate hiring practices in the 
United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article was to highlight various case studies and 
examples so that readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S. 
crusade against bribery suffers from several uncomfortable truths and 
double standards.  This is not just a legal issue, but also a policy issue that 
goes to the heart of the legitimacy and moral authority on which the United 
States acts.  Indeed, the policy reasons motivating Congress to enact the 
FCPA—that corporate payments were subverting the democratic process, 
undermining the integrity and stability of government, and eroding public 
confidence in basic institutions—apply with equal force to domestic 
bribery. 
At the very least, the above case studies and examples should cause 
readers to pause and reflect on whether the United States is indeed in a 
“unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption”175 or on the “right 
side of history.”176  Some readers may view merely posing such questions 
as provocative. 
The truth, however, is that similar questions were asked during the 
FCPA’s passage in 1977 as Congress quickly learned that corporate bribery 
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was not the “simple, safe issue it seem[ed] at first blush.”177  Moreover, the 
FCPA’s legislative history teaches that “trying to define exactly what 
bribery is is a real problem” and that “in certain instances, we have a gray 
area when it comes to this bribery question.”178  The FCPA’s legislative 
history further instructs that there will be “countless situations” in which 
fair-minded individuals “will be hard-put to determine whether a particular 
payment or practice is a legitimate and permissible business activity or a 
means of improper influence,”179 and it was further noted that reasonable 
persons “and even angels will differ on the answers . . . [and] such 
distinctions should make us less sweeping in our judgments and less 
confident in our solutions.”180 
If anything, the persistent and lingering questions about bribery are more 
pressing today given the current U.S. crusade against bribery—or at least 
bribery of a certain type.  As highlighted in this Article, however, 
“corruption is universal, and one has to be very careful when one takes a 
very righteous position.”181 
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